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A B S T R A C T
This paper studies the coordination of a two-echelon consignment channel in vendor managed inventory sys-
tems. The market demand is affected by retailer's marketing effort, retail price, manufacturer's CSR (Corporate
Social Responsibility) effort and the changes in economic and business conditions. We propose four contracts
that combine revenue and cost sharing to effectively coordinate the channel members which are referred to as
“revenue and production cost sharing”; “revenue, production cost and marketing cost sharing”; “revenue, production
cost and CSR cost sharing” and “revenue, production cost, marketing cost and CSR cost sharing”. Each contract is
represented by a fraction of sharing (α). In the deterministic demand, our analysis show that these sharing
contracts lead to Pareto improvements in comparison with the wholesale price contract for some ranges of α
values. Furthermore, we found that the first three contracts cannot coordinate the channel while the last contract
leads to a perfect coordination of the channel. In the stochastic demand, numerical examples show that the
sharing contracts where retailer shares the production cost of all consigned stocks always lead to Pareto im-
provements and the channel can be perfectly coordinated if the channel members share all of the costs. In
contrast, the Pareto improvements may not always be achieved with sharing contracts where retailer shares the
production cost of sold stocks and none of them can coordinate the channel. From managerial insights, our
research could help channel managers to improve the CSR implementation as well as the channel performance in
the short and long term.
1. Introduction
In current business practices, most manufacturers increasingly ad-
dress their concern on CSR issues due to the social and environmental
impacts of industrial activities in channel (Hsueh, 2015) and the in-
fluence of their customers, who increase their socially responsible
consumption practices (Gonzalez et al., 2009). Therefore, the manu-
facturer (M) can invest in CSR activities to meet the expectations of
consumers and support their business. An increase in CSR performance
requires higher CSR investment cost but leads to greater market de-
mand (Eltantawy et al., 2009; Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004). In addition
to M's CSR efforts, the retailer (R) can exploit the sales channel to
promote the market demand and boost sales (Wang and Hu, 2011). R's
sales channel includes different types of promotional activities such as
advertising, on-site shopping assistance, rebates and post-sales service.
However, these activities may constitute a significant portion of a firm's
operating expenses (Xiao et al., 2005). Hereafter, as did Ma et al.
(2013), we use the term “marketing efforts” to denote R's sales pro-
motional activities.
It is also well known that when the channel member's decisions on
efforts are made separately and each party pays the associated costs of
efforts to maximize their own profit, these strategies lead to local op-
timum solutions which may lower total profit of the whole channel.
In the past decades, the issues of designing coordinating contract
have received a great deal of research attention since it improves the
profit of both the channel and the individual channel member.
Coordinating contracts provide incentives to induce channel members
to behave in ways that are best for the whole channel while maximizing
their own profit. This situation leads to a coordination of the channel.
However, some coordinating contracts only reach the cooperation state
(Pareto improvement) where the channel members are better off with
the coordinating contract than any other different contracts
(Chakraborty et al., 2015). In practice, to coordinate the channel, many
coordination mechanisms such as consignment contract, Vendor
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.01.022
Received 9 April 2018; Received in revised form 23 August 2018; Accepted 15 January 2019
∗ Corresponding author. Univ Rennes 1, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, F-35000 Rennes, France.
E-mail addresses: dinhanhdhkt@gmail.com, anhpd@due.edu.vn (D.A. Phan), thi-le-hoa.vo@univ-rennes1.fr (T.L.H. Vo), anh-ngoc-lai@univ-rennes1.fr (A.N. Lai),
lananh.ckt@gmail.com (T.L.A. Nguyen).
International Journal of Production Economics 211 (2019) 98–118
Available online 25 January 2019
0925-5273/ © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
T
Managed Inventory (VMI), revenue-sharing contract and cost-sharing
contract have been introduced and implemented in industry.
The consignment contract and VMI are two common channel
practices that can be used separately (Gümüs et al., 2008). In a con-
signment contract, M as a consignor has the ownership of the inventory
at R (Bichescu and Fry, 2009). By contrast, M as a vendor manages
inventory for the R and decides when and how much to replenish in the
VMI system (Lee and Cho, 2014). However, the consignment process is
more complicated on a large scale, often involving VMI (Sarker, 2014)
and the consignment contract is assumed to be a part of the VMI system
(Bichescu and Fry, 2009). Under the VMI system complemented by a
consignment contract (VMI-CC), M monitors the R's inventory levels
and makes periodic replenishment decisions in terms of quantity and
frequency (Wong et al., 2009) while retaining ownership of the in-
ventory (Chen et al., 2010). VMI-CC has been adopted by many in-
dustries such as personal computer and automobile. Readers may refer
to Chen et al. (2010) for more examples of the VMI-CC. When the VMI-
CC was put into practice, an important issue arises is how to share the
revenue and costs between channel members to improve the channel's
profit while ensuring that each partner in the channel can benefit from
the VMI-CC. The issues of channel coordination under a VMI-CC with a
revenue sharing agreement have been widely studied in the literature
(Bernstein et al., 2006; Li et al., 2009). Besides, the cost sharing con-
tract has recently been used in coordinating a VMI system (Lee and Cho,
2014; Lee et al., 2016). However, none has addressed the channel co-
ordination issues in a VMI-CC with the presence of both R's marketing
effort and M's CSR effort using a revenue and cost sharing contract.
Therefore, in this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of a rev-
enue and cost sharing contract embedded in VMI-CC for coordinating
the channel integrating M's CSR and R's marketing efforts. We use the
sharing contracts according to which M supplies the products to be sold
to R's store while retains the ownership of these products, and the two
firms share their revenue and costs according to a sharing parameter
negotiated. Specifically, we propose four kinds of sharing contracts to
coordinate the channel including revenue and production cost sharing
(RP); “revenue, production cost and marketing cost sharing” (RPM);
“revenue, production cost and CSR cost sharing” (RPC) and “revenue,
production cost, marketing cost and CSR cost sharing” (RPMC). We
study the efficiency of each sharing contract in a two-echelon channel
wherein the market demand is affected by R's marketing effort, retail
price, M's CSR effort and the changes in economic and business con-
ditions. These settings represent realistic business practices for firms
dealing with channel coordination issues for the different decisions
impacting on the channel performance including not only the opera-
tional choices (quantity, price) and marketing decisions of the firms but
also the sustainable channel management. Then, in order to evaluate
the two important aspects of channel coordinating contracts including
the coordination and Pareto improvement, we model the decision-
making of the two firms in the decentralized channel as the M-
Stackelberg game and carry out equilibrium analysis with consideration
of wholesale price contract (WP) and four kinds of sharing contracts in
two situations: deterministic demand (DD) and stochastic demand (SD).
We use the results of decentralized channel under WP as a benchmark
for the evaluation of channel cooperation with the sharing contracts.
We also develop a corresponding model for centralized channel and use
the optimal results to investigate channel coordination.
Our contributions are two folds. First, we extend existing literature
to address the channel coordination issues in a channel with stochastic
demand which depends on retail price, R's marketing and M's CSR ef-
fort. Moreover, we show the effect of demand uncertainty on the co-
ordination of such a channel. Second, we construct the new sharing
contracts combining the VMI-CC with revenue sharing and cost sharing
contract in order to coordinate the chain. We further found that the
sharing contract proposed lead to a win–win-win situation, namely, R
and M earn more profit while the CSR performance of channel is im-
proved.
This paper is organized as follows: after this introductory section,
the literature review is presented in Section 2. We provide the problem
description with notations and assumptions in Section 3. Section 4 fo-
cuses on analyzing a centralized model and a decentralized model with
DD. Section 5 considers these two models under SD. In Section 6, we
conduct numerical studies to validate the proposed models. A summary
of the findings, the managerial insights and suggested directions for
future research are described in the last section.
2. Literature review
Integrating CSR into the channel coordination under a VMI-CC is
one of the distinctive features of the present research. In addition, we
aim the demonstration of the proposed sharing contracts in co-
ordinating such a channel. Therefore, we focus most of our attention on
the literature relating to the use of a revenue sharing and/or cost
sharing contract for coordinating a channel with the presence of M's
CSR and R's marketing effort, and the literature exploring the benefits
of a revenue and/or cost sharing contract within the framework of a
VMI-CC.
Studies on how to integrate CSR into channel coordination issues
have been receiving considerable attention in the academic community.
Some researchers have developed coordination mechanisms for co-
ordinating channel members considering the effects of CSR. Modak
et al. (2014) analytically discussed channel coordination using quantity
discounts along with an agreement on franchise fee and surplus profit
division while Hsueh (2015) considered a bi-level programming model
in order to analyze a CSR collaboration problem in a three-echelon
channel to maximize the profit of whole channel. In contrast, many
researchers used a revenue sharing and/or cost sharing contract to
coordinate the channel. Ni et al. (2010) developed a two-echelon
channel where the CSR cost is only incurred by the upstream firm and is
shared by a downstream firm through a WP. Hsueh (2014) proposed a
revenue sharing contract under which M invests in CSR and charges R a
wholesale price to coordinate CSR effort in a two-stage channel. Panda
et al. (2016) used revenue sharing and quantity discount contracts to
coordinate the channel where one of the firms, either M or R, is socially
responsible. In another study, Panda et al. (2017) proposed a revenue
sharing contract to resolve conflicts in a channel with product recycling
by using of Nash bargaining for dividing surplus profit. Recently, Raj
et al. (2018) used revenue and greening-cost sharing contracts to co-
ordinate a channel where M is responsible for greening and R is ac-
countable for social responsibility.
Notably, the terms of the revenue and/or cost sharing contracts in
the aforementioned research are bound by a WP. On the contrary, our
proposed sharing contracts are implemented in a channel undertaking a
VMI-CC. Under a VMI-CC, M sets the stocking quantity and retail price
but does not charge a wholesale price to R who sells the product for M
without suffering from the inventory risk (Wang et al., 2004; Li et al.,
2009; Chen et al., 2011). However, a few researchers have investigated
the suitability of a revenue sharing contract in coordinating VMI-CC.
Bernstein et al. (2006) identify the conditions according to which a
VMI-CC with a sharing mechanism works well for the entire channel. Li
et al. (2009) investigate the suitability of a VMI-CC with revenue
sharing by using a game-theoretical approach and find that the VMI-CC
can be perfectly coordinated but only under a very mild restriction on
the demand distribution. Ru and Wang (2010) indicate that it is ben-
eficial both to M and R when delegating the inventory decision to M
rather than to R in the VMI-CC with revenue sharing rules. Chen et al.
(2011) deal with the problem of coordinating a VMI-CC when price-
dependent revenue-sharing and show that the contract with a price-
decreasing revenue share performs worse than the one with fixed or
price-increasing revenue share. Chen (2013) extends their earlier work
to consider the dynamic joint effects of price and time on demand for
vertically decentralized two-echelon channel coordination and shows
that a VMI-CC with a revenue-sharing agreement tends to achieve lower
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retail prices, larger stock quantity, improved channel efficiency, and
increases in the profit of channel member. Cai et al. (2017) establish the
dynamic game relationship under a revenue sharing contract to co-
ordinate a VMI-CC facing service-sensitive customers.
Besides, cost sharing contract has recently embedded in the VMI-CC
to improve the channel performance. Lee and Cho (2014) propose a
VMI-CC that specifies fixed and proportional penalties charged to M
when stockouts occur at R. Lee et al. (2016) extend their study by in-
corporating limited storage capacity and fixed transfer payments, they
show that VMI-CC along with fixed transfer payments as well as
stockout-cost sharing can lead to the coordination regardless of M's
reservation cost. Considering the effects of marketing effort, the study
of De Giovanni et al. (2018) is the only paper that evaluates the benefits
of a cooperative advertising program (i.e., a cost sharing contract on R's
advertising) within the framework of a VMI-CC. It is also worth men-
tioning that our paper differs from theirs in two distinct ways. Firstly,
De Giovanni et al. (2018) don't take the effects of the CSR effort into
consideration whereas we discuss channel coordination issues by si-
multaneously considering the effects of R's marketing and M's CSR ef-
forts. Secondly, instead of considering a VMI-CC where M sets the
stocking quantity while R decides both the retail price and the mar-
keting effort (i.e., advertising), we address a VMI-CC where M decides
both on the stocking quantity and retail price while R only decides on
the marketing effort.
According to the literature we reviewed, our research is the first
which attempts to explore the benefits of revenue and cost sharing
contract in coordinating a channel undertaking a VMI-CC integrating
M's CSR and R's marketing efforts.
3. Problem description, notations and assumptions
3.1. Problem description
We consider a two-echelon VMI-CC consisting of one M and one R,
in which M produces the product and sells it through R who then sells
the products to the final consumers. M can invest in CSR activities to
increase demand, while R can influence the demand by exerting mar-
keting efforts. The trade between M and R can be either a WP or a
sharing contract. We define a sharing contract as being the combination
of the revenue sharing and cost sharing between M and R, and em-
bedded in VMI-CC. Under such a contract, M retains the ownership of
the consignment stock, decides on the retail price and directly manages
the inventory at R's store (i.e., decides on stocking quantity). Besides, M
and R enter into a long-term commitment to share their costs and
revenues. Therefore, the sharing contract also specifies the sharing
parameters to allocate the channel's costs and revenue. For simplicity,
we assume that the same sharing terms for revenue are used to share
the costs meaning that if one kind of cost is shared, the fraction of cost
sharing is equal to that of revenue sharing and we call it the sharing
fraction for short. Further, we extend our model using different sharing
parameters for efforts costs. Under the sharing contracts, the decision
on the level of sharing fraction has to be made before deciding on the
level of efforts. Based on which, R is free to determine the marketing
effort level and M is free to determine the CSR effort level to maximize
their own profit. Specifically, we propose four kinds of sharing contract
to coordinate a VMI-CC. All sharing contracts are constructed from the
revenue sharing perspective and the main difference is the cost sharing
perspective.
Contract RP: The Revenue and Production cost sharing.
Contract RPM: The Revenue, Production cost and Marketing cost
sharing.
Contract RPC: The Revenue, Production cost and CSR cost sharing.
Contract RPMC: The Revenue, Production cost, Marketing cost and
CSR cost sharing.
In each kind of sharing contracts, we distinguish between two types
of contracts depending on how the production cost of the consignment
stock is shared. The first one is called “OS contract” if the production
cost of only sold stock is shared. The second one is called “AS contract”
if the production cost of all consignment stock (sold and unsold) is
shared.
In the RP OS contract, the inventory at R is owned by M, R does not
pay M upon receipt of the stock but shares the sales revenue on units
sold. For each unit of any sold stock, R keeps a fraction α∈(0, 1) of the
revenue for herself and returns the rest 1−α to M and R incurs a
fraction α of production cost for each unit of stock sold.
In the RPM OS contract, R keeps a fraction α∈(0, 1) of the revenue
per unit sold, incurs a fraction α of production cost for sold stock and M
is willing to absorb a fraction 1− α of R's marketing cost.
In the RPC OS contract, R keeps a fraction α∈(0, 1) of the revenue
per unit sold, incurs a fraction α of production cost for sold stock and R
is willing to absorb a fraction α of M's CSR cost.
In the RPMC OS contract, R keeps a fraction α∈(0, 1) of the revenue
per unit sold, incurs a fraction α of production cost for sold stock and R
and M share their costs of marketing and CSR with each other according
to a fraction α, i.e., R absorbs a fraction α of M's CSR cost while M
absorbs a fraction 1− α of R's marketing cost.
The RP AS, RPM AS, RPC AS and RPMC AS contracts are similar to
the RP OS, RPM OS, RPC OS and RPMC OS contracts, respectively, but
R incurs a fraction α of production cost for all consignment stock.
3.2. Notations
The following notations are used to formulate the channel model
discussed in this paper.
p: Unit retail price p e( , , ):jD jD jD The optimal decisions for
decentralized channel under contract j in
DD
z: Stocking factor of inventory p e( , , ):jS jS jS The optimal decisions for de-
centralized channel under contract j in SD
w: Unit wholesale price that M charges
to R
, ,mWP rWP cWP : M’s, R’s and channel’s
profit1 under WP in DD
θ: M’s CSR effort level , ,mj rj cj: M’s, R’s and channel’s profit
under sharing contract j in DD
e: R's marketing effort level E E E[ ], [ ], [ ]mWP rWP cWP : M’s, R’s and
channel’s expected profit under WP in SD
c: Unit production cost for M E E E[ ], [ ], [ ]mj rj cj : M’s, R’s and chan-
nel’s expected profit under sharing contract
j in SD.
a: Market scale parameter ΠI : The profit of the centralized channel
b: Price elasticity of the demand E [ ]I : The expected profit of the centra-
lized channel
γ: Marginal effect of marketing effort
on demand parameter
λ: Marginal effect of CSR effort on d-
emand parameter
η: Marginal marketing effort cost par-
ameter
κ: Marginal CSR effort cost parameter
i: Indicator of firm, i=m (M), r (R)
j: Indicator of the sharing contract
m, r, c: The subscript corresponding to
M, R, and the decentralized chan-
nel
3.3. Assumptions
We use the following specific assumptions: (1) The market demand
D˜ has the functional form of = +D D˜ where =D D p e( , , ) is the
expected demand and ξ is a random scaling factor, representing ran-
domness of the market demand due to changes in economic and busi-
ness conditions, ξ is supported on [A,B], having cumulative distribution
function F(x), and probability density function f(x). We also model the
expected demand as a multi-variable linear function of marketing
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effort, CSR effort and retail price, i.e., = + +D a bp e with a, b,
and being positive parameters and a-bc>0 are assumed for the
demand function. The parameter, a, is the base market size, b is the
price elasticity of demand, γ measures the influence of marketing effort
on demand, and λ indicates the demand-enhancing effectiveness of M's
CSR effort (per unit of effort). This kind of expected demand function
has been widely used to incorporate the price, marketing and CSR effort
impacting on the demand (e.g., Ghosh and Shah, 2015; Ma et al., 2017).
Here, the demand is decreasing in the retail price, increasing in both the
R's Marketing effort and the M's CSR effort level. In practice, the M's
CSR effort level can be measured by some social or environmental
criteria, such as employment of the disabled, overtime hours, energy
consumption, or CO2 emissions (Hsueh, 2015). (3) Quadratic functions
are assumed to formulate R's marketing cost and M's CSR cost, ie., the
cost of the marketing efforts at level e is e /22 where > 0; the cost of
the CSR efforts at level θ is /22 where > 0. This type of cost func-
tions has been used by several researchers as shown in the literature
(e.g., Bhaskaran and Krishnan, 2009; Ma et al., 2017). (4) Our model
does not include either holding or stockout costs and the unsold stock's
salvage value is zero. (5) Both M and R possess full and symmetric
information regarding costs and demand.
4. Modelling with deterministic demand
Remark 2. When the demand is deterministic, it is clearly optimal for
the decision-maker to use a stocking quantity equal to demand. In
addition, there is no risk associated with overstocking. Therefore, we do
not distinguish between two types of contracts: the OS contract and the
AS contract for the DD case.
4.1. The centralized channel model
In a centralized channel, the channel members are vertically in-
tegrated under the central planner for joint profit maximization. The
central planner decides the optimal retail price, stocking quantity,
marketing level, and CSR level for the entire channel.
The profit of the centralized channel in the DD is
= p c D e( ) /2 /2I 2 2 (1)
As Ma et al. (2013), we impose a restriction of+ >b2 02 2 and >b2 02 to ensure positive values of
the decision variables in the centralized channel and the Hessian matrix
of ΠI is a negative definite. Under this restriction, the profit of the
centralized channel is jointly concave in p, e, and θ, therefore, the op-
timal decisions of retail price pID, marketing effort level eID, and CSR
effort level ID can be obtained through the first order optimality con-
ditions. The optimal stocking quantity results from substituting
p e( , , )I
D
I
D
I
D into the demand function. However, we do not present it
to save place. Similarly, substituting p e( , , )ID ID ID into Eq. (1), we ob-
tain the optimal profit of the centralized channel. The results are listed
in Table 1.
4.2. The decentralized channel model
In a decentralized channel, the channel members make their own
decisions separately to maximize their own profits, but the decision
making results are mutually influential. The sequence of events under a
WP is as follows: In the first stage, M decides on the CSR effort level and
the wholesale price. In the second stage, for a given wholesale price and
CSR effort level chosen by M, R determines the marketing effort level,
the retail price and uses a stocking quantity equal to demand to max-
imize her profit. We model the decision-making problems of the two
channel members under WP as a Stackelberg game in which the M acts
as the leader and the R as the follower.
Under the sharing contracts, the sequence of events is as follows: In
the first step, both firms negotiate a sharing fraction α. Then, in the
second step, M decides the retail price and the CSR effort level and
chooses a stocking quantity equal to demand to maximize his own
profit. In the third step, based on M's decisions, R decides only on the
marketing effort level to obtain her own profit maximization.
Therefore, after the sharing fraction was chosen, the behavior of M and
R under the sharing contracts can be described by using M-Stackelberg
setting where M as the leader and R as follower. Then, the Stackelberg
game corresponding to each contract can be expressed as follows:
We solve the games by backward induction. The equilibrium results
with DD are listed in Tables 1 and 2. Please see all Proof of tables in
Appendix A.
4.3. Analytical results for channel performance in the deterministic demand
4.3.1. The preliminary conditions
We focus on the condition when >b /22 and > ¯ where= b¯ /(2 )2 2 to ensure that the Hessian matrix of ΠI in the cen-tralized case is negative definite matrices. Moreover, in order for the
channel's members to have incentives to participate in the sharing
contracts, we need to assure positive profits for each partner in the
channel, ie., > 0mj and > 0rj (hereafter, > 0i j for short).
Therefore, we restrict the range of α values considered under each
sharing contract. We assume that this holds throughout the paper.
4.3.2. The impact of α on the investment effort cost allocation
The capital investment required to generate a unit of demand is
/2 2 for marketing effort while /2 2 for CSR effort. Thus, the ratio, H,
is calculated by /2 2 demonstrates the cost-effectiveness of investing
in marketing effort versus CSR effort. As H is less than one, the mar-
keting effort is more cost-effective than the CSR effort, whereas, H is
equal to one refers that CSR and marketing activities have the same
cost-effectiveness. Some algebraic calculations based on the optimal
decisions results show that the rate of investment in CSR compared to
marketing effort of the channel (i.e., the CSR investment cost divide by
the marketing effort cost) is equal to H in the WP and RPMC contract.
By contrast, this rate depends on both H and the sharing fraction for
other contracts. Namely, the value of this rate is H( 1)22 in RP contract,
H( 1)2 in RPM contract and H12 in RPC contract. In addition, these
Contract Stage 1 Stage 2
WP = w c Dmax ( ) /2
w
m
WP
,
2 = p w D emax ( ) /2
p e
r
WP
,
2
RP = p c Dmax ( )(1 ) /2
p
m
RP
,
2 = p c D emax ( ) /2
e
r
RP 2
RPM = p c D emax ( )(1 ) (1 ) /2 /2
p
m
RPM
,
2 2 = p c D emax ( ) /2
e
r
RPM 2
RPC = p c Dmax ( )(1 ) (1 ) /2
p
m
RPC
,
2 = p c D emax ( ) /2 /2
e
r
RPC 2 2
RPMC = p c D emax ( )(1 )
p
m
RPMC
,
(1 )
2
2 (1 )
2
2 = p c D emax ( ) /2 /2
e
r
RPMC 2 2
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values are decreasing functions of the sharing fraction for a given H.
Therefore, the channel will increase the allocation of capital to the
investment in CSR in two scenarios: when marketing effort is less cost
effective than CSR or when M receives more sales of the channel and
accordingly, incurs more cost of the chain. This finding implies that in
order to increase the investment in CSR activities in a channel where
CSR effort is less cost effective, it is necessary that M undertakes more
cost of the channel and accordingly, receive more sales.
4.3.3. The impact of α on the channel member's profit
In this section, we're interested in understanding how the selection
of α impacts on R's and M's profits. With this aim, we evaluate the
relative gains/losses realized by the contracting parties associated with
the sharing contract versus WP. We let ,mj rj represent the relative
gains/losses of M and R under the sharing contract j versus WP, re-
spectively, i.e., = ( ) /mj mj mWP mWP ; = ( ) /rj rj rWP rWP. > 0mj ,
( > 0rj ) indicates that M (R) is better off under the sharing contract j.
From the results in Table 2, ij is a function of α. Moreover, M's profit
and R's profit are independent of α under WP. Thus, the impact of α on
M's profit (R's profit) under the sharing contract j is the same as that of
α on mj ( rj). By examining the sign of the functions = /i j ij with
the condition of > 0i j , we drive the impact of α on the profit of M and
R in each sharing contract. (Please see the details of our analysis in
Appendix B1). We summarize the impact of α on M's profit with the
following results: (1) In the RP contract: As >b /2 , M's profit always
decreases in α and M prefers the RP contract to the WP if α is less than
50%. This also implies that if M has more contractual power than R, he
will choose a value of α approaching zero to attain the highest profit.
Conversely, when <b /2 , M's profit increases with α for any α in the
range of b(0, 2 /3 )2 . Thus, M chooses a value of α approaching b2 /3 2
to attain the highest profit. However, M prefers the RP contract to the
WP, only if α is higher than 50% in this situation. (2) In the RPM
contract: M's profit always decreases in α and M prefers the RPM
contract to the WP if α is less than 50%. M achieves the highest profit if
α approaches zero. (3) In the RPC contract: as is higher than a
threshold level, i.e., = b2 /(2 )2 2 , the smaller the selection of α,
the more profits M gets. This implies that M obtains the highest profit if
the value of α approaches zero. Otherwise, M should raise the value of
α approach b(2 )/32 2 to attract the highest profit. (4) In the
RPMC contract: M's profit always decreases with α. Therefore, M attains
the highest profit if α approaches zero.
Similarly, we summarize the impact of α on R's profit with the
following results: (1) In the RP contract: as κ is higher than a threshold
level, ie, > b b b(3 2 )/(4 2 )2 2 2 2 2 , R's profit increases with
α∈(0,1). This suggests that if R has more contractual power than M, she
increases the value of α approaching one to attract the highest profit.
This also means that R should incur most of the production costs and
extract most of the channel sales to maximize her profit. By contrast, R
attains the highest profit if α approaches= +b b b b(2 )/(4 3 )rRP 2 2 2 2 2 2 . (2) In the RPM contract:
as κ is higher than a threshold level, i.e, = 2¯ , R's profit increases withα∈(0,1), therefore, R increases the value of to approach one to attract
the highest profit. Conversely, R rises α to approach= + b( 2 )/rRPM 2 2 2 to maximize her profit. (3) In the RPC
contract: As η is higher than a threshold level, i.e, = b4 /(2 )2 2 , R
increases the value of α to approach one to attract more profit. On the
contrary, R rises to approach b(2 )/42 2 to attain the highest
profit. (4) In the RPMC contract: R's profit always increases with the
value of α. Therefore, R attains the highest profit if α approaches one.
4.3.4. The impact of α on the channel's profit
We further investigate the impacts of α on the channel's profit. With
this aim, similar to Cachon (2003), we define the efficiency of the de-
centralized channel with respect to the centralized channel, as the ratio
of the channel's profit to the profit of the centralized channel, i.e.,=E /j cj I . By examining the sign of the functions = E ( )/cj j with
the conditions of > 0i j , we summarize the impact of α on the chan-
nel's profit through the following results (the details of our analysis can
Table 2
M's, R's and channel's profit under centralized and decentralized channel in DD.
Models/Contract R's profit M's profit Total profit
Centralized Omitted Omitted +a bcb( )22( 2 2 2)
Decentralized channel WP a bc b
b
( )2 (2 2) 2
2(4 2 2 2)2
a bc
b
( )2
2(4 2 2 2)
a bc b
b
( )2 (6 3 2 2)
2(4 2 2 2)2
RP +a bc bb( )
2 (2 3 2) 2
2(2 2 2 2 2)2 + +a bcb( )
2(1 )
4 2 4 2 2 2 2
++a bc b b( )
2 ((2 2) 2 ( 2 2) 2 ( 2 2))
2(2 2 2 2 2)2
RPM +a bc bb( )
2 (2 2) 2
2( 2 2 2 2)2 + +a bcb( )
2(1 )
2 2 4 2 2 2 2
+ ++a bc bb( )
2 ( 2 ( 2 ( 1)2 2))
2( 2 2 2 2)2
RPC +a bc b b( )
2 (2 3 2 2)
2(2 2 2 2))2 +a bc b( )
2(1 )
4 2 4 2 2
++a bc bb( )
2 ( 2 2 2 2 2 2)
2(2 2 2 2)2
RPMC +a bcb( )22( 2 2 2) +a bcb(1 )( )22( 2 2 2) +a bcb( )22( 2 2 2)
Table 1
The optimal decisions for centralized and decentralized channel in DD.
Models/Contract Retail price Marketing effort level (e) CSR effort level (θ)
Centralized + +c a bcb( )2 2 2 +a bcb( )2 2 2 +a bcb( )2 2 2
Decentralized channel WP +c a bc b
b b
( )(3 2)
(4 2 2 2)
a bc
b
( )
4 2 2 2
a bc
b
( )
4 2 2 2
RP + + +c a bcb( )2 2 2 2 2 + +a bcb( )2 2 2 2 2 + +a bcb( )(1 )2 2 2 2 2
RPM + + +c a bcb( )2 2 2 2 + +a bcb( )2 2 2 2 + +a bcb( )(1 )2 2 2 2
RPC + +c a bcb( )2 2 2 2 +a bcb( )2 2 2 2 +a bcb( )2 2 2 2
RPMC + +c a bcb( )2 2 2 +a bcb( )2 2 2 +a bcb( )2 2 2
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be seen in Appendix B2): (1) The decentralized channel with the RP
contract generates the highest profit when α is chosen at= + +cRP bb b22 2 4 22 2 24 2 2 2 2 2 . Furthermore, the channel's profit in the
RP contract is always less than the profit of the centralized channel. (2)
The channel efficiency of the RPM contract always decreases in α, ap-
proaches one as α approaches zero and approaches +b
b
2
2
2 2
2 as α
approaches one. (3) The decentralized channel with the RPC contract
generates the highest profit when α is chosen at = +cRPC b b22 2 22 2 .
However, the channel's profit in the RPC contract is always less than the
profit of the centralized channel. (4) The decentralized channel with the
RPMC contract generates the same profit as that of the centralized
channel and the channel efficiency of the RPMC contract does not de-
pend on the selection of α.
Remark 3. From the above analysis, we observe that the channel
efficiency is highest in the RPMC contract and the RPMC contract
perfectly coordinates the channel while the RP, RPM and RPC contracts
do not coordinate the channel. Note that when α=0 in the RPM
contract, the channel efficiency is equal to one, thus RPM can lead a
perfectly coordinated channel. However, M captures all the channel
profits while R obtains zero profit in this situation. Therefore, R has no
incentive to accept an RPM contract with the sharing fraction equal to
zero.
4.3.5. Channel cooperation and CSR-performance under sharing contracts
Let (¯ , ¯ )
j j j represent a Pareto-improving region where > 0mj
and > 0rj , then we find that there exists an interval of j values such
that both R and M earn greater profits under the sharing contract j than
under a WP. Thus, both R and M are willing to accept the sharing
contracts. Furthermore, to ensure the sustainability of channel co-
ordination, we also consider whether CSR is improved in the coopera-
tion state. In the propositions 1–4, we provide the upper ( ¯ j) and lower
bounds (¯
j) of the Pareto-improving region and investigate the CSR
performance in this region corresponding to each sharing contract.
Proposition 1. In the RP contract:
(1) When >b /2 and > ¯ then = u v¯ 0.5RP 1 1 ; =¯ 0.5,RP where= + + ++ + + +u b b bb b b b1 (16 2 ( 4 )(2 3 ))4 4 (2 5 ) (24 16 )3 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 2 26 2 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 ,
=
++ + ++ + + +
v
b b b
b b
b b b b
and
( )(2 4 ) (3 16
8 ( 2 ) (8 5 ))
(4 4 (2 5 ) (24 16 ))
.
1
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 2
2 2 2 2 2 4
6 2 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2
(2) >RPD WPD when < <¯ ¯RP RP and the conditions of part (1) are sa-tisfied.
Proposition 2. In the RPM contract:
(1) When >b /22 and > ¯ then = +u v¯ RPM 2 2 ; =¯ 0.5RPM ,where-= + + +u b b b(4 2 (3 8 ) (16 12 3 ))/22 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 4
and = + ++ +v b bb b((2 4 ) (4 8 ( 2 )(16 16 5 )))/2 2 2 2 4 2 2 22 2 2 2 4 4 8 .
(2) >RPMD WPD when < <¯ ¯RPM RPM and the conditions of part (1) aresatisfied.
Proposition 3. In the RPC contract, let= + + ++ +u b b bb b3 (2 )(16 4 8 ( ))(8 3 ( 4 ) 4 (3 10 ))2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 22 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 ,
= + + ++ +v
b b b b
b b
3
( 2 ) (2 4 ) 8 4 6 4
(8 3 ( 4 ) 4 (3 10 ))
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
2
4 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
,
=
b b b
1
1
4 (2 )( ) 4( )
2 2 4
2 2 2
2
2 ; and = bb2 14 ( )2 2 4 3 42 3
b4( )
2
2 , we have :
(1) When < b/ 5 /22 2 , <1 2 or when >b 5 /22 , < <¯ 2then = u v¯ 0.5( )RPC 3 3 ; = +u v¯ 0.5( )RPC 3 3 . Otherwise, when>b /2 , > 2 then = u v¯ 0.5( )RPC 3 3 ; =¯ RPC+b b(2 2 )/(4 4 )2 2 2 .
(2) >RPCD WPD when < <¯ ¯RPC RPC and the conditions of part (1) aresatisfied.
Proposition 4. In the RPMC contract:
(1) When >b /22 and > ¯ then = ++¯ RPMC b bb( 2 ) ( 2 )(2 4 )2 2 22 2 2 ;= +¯ RPMC bb( 2 )2 422 2 .
(2) >RPMCD WPD when < <¯ ¯RPMC RPMC and the conditions of part (1)are satisfied.
(3) = =e e,RPMCD ID RPMCD ID, =p pRPMCD ID, = (1 )mRPMC I
and =rRPMC I for any < <0 1.
Remark 4. Part 1 of Propositions 2 and 4 shows that RPM and RPMC
always bring the channel to Pareto improvement regardless of the impact of
price on market demand, while Part 1 of Propositions 1 and 3 shows that RP
and RPC only reach this cooperation state when the effect of price is
relatively high i.e., >b /2 . From Part 2 of Proposition 1-4 the sharing
contracts can simultaneously achieve the following objectives: (i) improve
CSR performance; (ii) improve total channel profits; (iii) ensure that each
partner in the channel can benefit from the contract. Moreover, part 3 of
Proposition 4 shows that the RPMC contract can maximize the channel
profit and arbitrarily allocate the profit between M and R based on each
player’s negotiation power (i.e., through negotiation to determine α)
4.4. Bargaining problem
In the previous subsection, we reached the analytical solution to the
existence of Pareto-improving region such that both M and R are willing
to cooperate under each sharing contract and lead to larger channel's
profit. We now use the Nash bargaining model presented by Nash
(1950) to determine the optimal sharing fraction. In a Nash bargaining
game, two players cooperatively decide to how to split the additional
profits that occurs as a result of their interaction. How to split this extra
profit depends on the bargaining power of both players and the values
of threat points (i.e., the value they are able to obtain when there is no
cooperation) (Bhaskaran and Krishnan, 2009; Wu et al., 2009). Assume
that M has bargaining power δ, while that of R is 1-δ, where δ∈[0,1].
Let =mj mj mWP , =rj rj rWP be the extra profit of M, R
under each sharing contract versus WP, respectively. Using M's and R's
profits in the WP contract reflecting theirs threat points, we have a
bargain problem over (¯ , ¯ )
j j j to the share the joint extra-profit
under sharing contract j, i.e., = > 0cj cj cWP . To obtain the Na-
sh's solution, the following optimization needs to be solved:
Max ( ) ( )mj rj
1 , subject to constraints > 0mj and > 0rj (i.e.,
Pareto-improving region). The analytical solutions of this kind of pro-
blems are difficult. Therefore, we leave it to be resolved by a numerical
method to get more insights on the effects of bargaining power on the
allocation of the joint extra-profit between the channel members.
4.5. The sharing contracts are with different sharing parameters for effort
costs
So far, our analysis results above depend heavily on the assumption
that the firms use the same sharing rule for all costs. We now extend our
analysis using different the sharing parameters for efforts costs. We
denote such a contract as (α,φ,β) where α ∈(0,1) is the fraction of the
gross profit (i.e., the total revenue minus the production cost of sold
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stocks) that R receives, φ∈ [0,1] is the fraction of R's marketing cost
that R undertakes, and β∈ [0,1] is the fraction of M's CSR effort cost
which R agrees to share with M. Under this setting, the equilibrium
results can be derived by following backward induction. However, we
obtained complex results that are difficult to analyze following the
same procedure used in Section 4.3. Thus, we resort to numerical
methods to illustrate the Pareto-improving region for this case in the
last subsection of the next section.
4.6. Numerical results for channel performance in the deterministic demand
We assume the parameters as follows: a=101, b=3, c=10,
γ=0.9, λ=1, η=0.8 and κ=1.6. The parameters of a, b, c satisfy
that the demand is positive when the retail price is equal to the pro-
duction cost, i.e., p= c, and the parameters of γ, λ, η and κ satisfy the
preliminary conditions of + = >b2 5.584 02 2 and= >b2 3.99 02 . We fix the benchmark parameter values above and
focus on analyzing the effects of the sharing parameters on the per-
formance of sharing contracts. We also seek to identify the Pareto-im-
proving region in which the adoption of the sharing contract is feasible.
4.6.1. The sharing contracts use the same sharing rule
By using the parameter values, we first compute the optimal deci-
sions and the profit of the centralized channel. Similarly, we compute
the optimal decisions and the profit of M and R under WP (the results
are presented in Tables 6 and 7 in Section 6.2). We next compute M's
and R's optimal decisions and profit in the decentralized channel under
sharing contracts corresponding to the values of α in the range of [0.01,
0.99]. Based on the computational results (i.e. the profit of M and R),
we evaluate the performance of each sharing contract in the two fol-
lowing aspects: (1) the relative gains/losses of M (i.e., mj ) and R (i.e.,
r
j) under sharing contract j versus WP (see Section 4.3.3), (2) the
channel efficiency of sharing contract j, i.e., E j (see Section 4.3.4). We
present the results of mj , rj and E j for the DD in Table 3. Furthermore,
we also present the optimal decision of M on CSR effort level in this
table to verify whether the CSR performance is improved in the co-
operation state.
4.6.1.1. The effects of the sharing fraction on profits. The results of mj
and rj in Table 3 demonstrate that R's profit increases and M's profit
decreases with α in all the sharing contracts. (As we proved in section
4.3.3). We also display the value of E j in Table 3 through Fig. 1 to
evidence that the channel efficiency is concave in α under RP and RPC
contracts whereas it decreases in α under RPM contract and remains
stable at one under RPMC contract. Following the results in Section
4.3.4, we obtain the value of α that maximizes the channel efficiency
under each sharing contract. Namely, =E 0.916MaxRP at α= 0.582,=E 0.964MaxRPC at α= 0.726 and EMaxRPM approach one when α
approaches to zero. These numerical results demonstrate that the RP,
RPM and RPC contracts cannot coordinate the channel while the RPMC
contract perfectly coordinates the channel under DD.
4.6.1.2. The Pareto improvements and CSR-performance. As displayed in
Table 3, if the beforehand negotiated α is at 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5
respectively, > 0mj and > 0rj . (For example, when α=0.4 then= =0.17, 0.45mRP rRP ; = =0.22, 0.64mRPM rRPM ; = 0.17,mRPC= 0.45rRPC and = =0.29 , 0.61mRPMC rRPMC ). This means that both R
and M earn greater profits under the sharing contracts than under WP if
the sharing faction was chosen at 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5 respectively. Thus,
the Pareto improvements can be achieved if the sharing fraction was
chosen at these values. From Proposition 1-4, we can determine the
exact value of α in the Pareto-improving region which leads to a win-
win outcome, namely, RP (0.275, 0.5), RPM (0.232, 0.5), RPC
(0.291, 0.543) and RPMC (0.249, 0.533). Moreover, from observing
the value of column θ in Table 3, we find that the CSR performance of
the channel under each sharing contract is higher than those in WP for
all α values within the Pareto-improving region. (For example, when
α=0.3, M's CSR effort under RP, RPM, RPC and RPMC are 6.27, 6.83,
9.31 and 10.17 respectively. These levels of CSR are higher than that
under WP (i.e., 4.746).
4.6.1.3. The effects of the bargaining power on the allocation of the joint
extra-profit. We define = /mj mj cj and = /rj rj cj are relative
joint extra profits of M and R in the sharing contract j, respectively. The
relationship between mj ( rj) and the bargaining power parameter, δ, is
displayed in Fig. 2 (a) (Fig. 2 (b)), respectively. These figures show that
the patterns of rj follow the opposite patterns of mj in all scenarios. R's
share of the joint extra profits has a decreasing behavior with respect to
M's bargaining power. Thus, the two parties will divide the joint extra-
profit proportionally to their bargaining power. In case that the M (R) is
Table 3
Computational results for the DD case.
A α RP RPM RPC RPMC
Υm Υr E θ Υm Υr E θ Υm Υr E θ Υm Υr E θ
A=0 0.01 0.73 −0.96 0.81 8.19 1.12 −0.95 1.00 10.06 0.73 −0.97 0.81 8.29 1.12 −0.96 1.00 10.17
0.1 0.61 −0.64 0.84 7.63 0.90 −0.55 1.00 9.03 0.63 −0.67 0.84 8.58 0.93 −0.60 1.00 10.17
0.2 0.47 −0.27 0.87 6.97 0.67 −0.13 0.99 7.91 0.51 −0.32 0.87 8.93 0.71 −0.20 1.00 10.17
0.3 0.32 0.09 0.89 6.27 0.44 0.27 0.99 6.83 0.37 0.03 0.90 9.31 0.50 0.21 1.00 10.17
0.4 0.17 0.45 0.90 5.53 0.22 0.64 0.98 5.77 0.23 0.40 0.92 9.72 0.29 0.61 1.00 10.17
0.5 0.00 0.80 0.91 4.75 0.00 1.00 0.96 4.75 0.07 0.78 0.94 10.17 0.07 1.01 1.00 10.17
0.6 −0.18 1.14 0.92 3.91 −0.21 1.34 0.95 3.75 −0.10 1.16 0.96 10.67 −0.14 1.41 1.00 10.17
0.7 −0.36 1.46 0.91 3.03 −0.42 1.66 0.93 2.77 −0.29 1.55 0.96 11.21 −0.36 1.81 1.00 10.17
0.8 −0.56 1.77 0.89 2.09 −0.62 1.96 0.92 1.83 −0.50 1.93 0.96 11.82 −0.57 2.21 1.00 10.17
0.9 −0.77 2.04 0.86 1.08 −0.81 2.24 0.90 0.90 −0.74 2.30 0.94 12.49 −0.79 2.62 1.00 10.17
0.99 −0.98 2.26 0.82 0.11 −0.98 2.49 0.88 0.09 −0.97 2.62 0.91 13.17 −0.98 2.98 1.00 10.17
Fig. 1. E j changes with α in the DD.
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Fig. 2. (a) mj , (b) rj and (c) mj rj, changes with M's bargaining power.
Fig. 3. The Pareto-improving region in the RPM (a), RPC (b) and RPMC contract (c) with different sharing parameters for effort costs.
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a dominant player (i.e., δ=1, res, δ=0), they are able to obtain the
entire joint extra-profit. When M and R have equal power, i.e., δ=0.5,
the common knowledge in the bargaining literature of the Nash's model
predicts that the channel members will equally split the joint extra-
profits. In our numeric results, M obtains higher joint extra-profit than
R under RPM and RPMC contracts but lower under other contracts
when the channel member has the same power (see Fig. 2 (c)). The
explanation here is that we do not assume that the threat points of both
parties are the same. Therefore, our numeric results reflect the different
positions of M and R in the negotiation and the effects of marketing and
CSR activities on the allocation of the joint extra-profit between the
channel members.
4.6.2. The Pareto-improving region with different sharing parameters
The Pareto-improving region is plotted in Fig. 3 (a) with respect to α
and φ for the RPM contract with differentiating between the sharing
rule for gross profit, α, and the sharing rule for the marketing cost, φ
(i.e., the sharing contract as (α, φ, 0)). Every pair (α, φ) in this region
presents a feasible solution to the bargaining problem that leads to
higher profits of both channel members. Similarly, Fig. 3 (b) illustrates
the Pareto-improving region with respect to α and β for the RPC con-
tract with differentiating between the sharing rule for gross profit, α,
and the sharing rule for the CSR effort cost, β (i.e., the sharing contract
as (α, 1, β)). For a general contract (α, φ, β) (i.e., RPMC contract with
differentiating the sharing rule for the gross profit, α, the sharing rule
for the marketing cost, φ, and the sharing rule for the CSR cost, β), we
plotted in Fig. 3 (c) all triples of (α, φ, β) that identify the feasible
solutions for the bargaining problem. Therefore, M and R will get more
profit if they decide the sharing parameters (α, φ, β) in this region.
Compared to the results of original model using the same sharing rules,
we find that the use of different sharing coefficients will expand more
the feasible region for the effort costs sharing. In addition, when a
channel member undertakes more cost of efforts, they will require an
increase in the gross profit received accordingly. Interestingly, the ne-
gotiable range values of gross profit sharing do not change significantly
compared to the original model. This result implies that regardless of
efforts cost sharing, the adoption of a cooperative program on efforts is
never feasible when most of the gross profits go to either M or R.
Further, M is willing to implement a cooperative program on marketing
efforts only when R bears marketing cost higher than a threshold (i.e.,
13,6%). Whereas, R is willing to implement a cooperative program on
CSR efforts only when R incurs CSR cost lower than a threshold, about
80%. This finding is quite intuitive, the increase in cost share borne by
the partner leads a decrease in benefits for the party who handles the
activities and makes the implementation of a cooperative program on
efforts difficult to be feasible.
5. Modelling with stochastic demand
5.1. The centralized channel model
In the centralized channel with the SD, a central decision maker
chooses the stocking quantity (q), the retail price, the CSR and mar-
keting effort level to maximize the profit of the entire channel.
Following Petruzzi and Dada (1999), we define the stocking factor of
inventory z as =z q D to cover the randomness of demand. Let= = +z E Min z f d zf d[ ] [ ( , )] ( ) ( )
A
z
z
B
,
= =z z z F z[ ] [ ]/ 1 ( ), = =z z z f z[ ] [ ]/ ( )2 2 . The ex-
pected profit of the centralized channel in the SD, denoted as E [ ]IS is= + +E p D z c D z e[ ] ( [ ]) ( ) /2 2IS 2 2 (2)
In Eq. (2), the first term is the expected revenue, the second term is
the production cost, the third is the marketing cost and the fourth is the
cost of CSR effort.
We apply a sequential procedure (Wang et al., 2004) to find the
optimal solutions, denoted by (p z e, , ,IS I IS IS) that maximize E [ ]IS of
Eq. (2). That is, we find the optimal decisions (p e, ,IS IS IS) for a given z,
and then maximize E [ ]IS over z to find zI . For the optimal solutions, let
r(.)= f(.)/(1 - F(.)) represent the hazard rate function of the demand
distribution, the following theorem is given.
Theorem 1. For any fixed z∈[A,B], the optimal retail price (pIS), marketing
effort level (eIS) and CSR effort level ( IS) in the centralized channel with the
SD are given by
= + += + + = + +
p z p z
b
z
z
b
e z e z
b
( ) [ ]
2
; ( )
[ ]
2
; ( ) [ ]
2
I
S
I
D
I
S
I
D
I
S
I
D
2 2
2 2 2 2
If F(·) satisfies 2r(z)2 + dr(z)/dz > 0 and >++ 0a bc Ab( )22 2 , the
optimal zI that maximizes E [ ]IS is unique in the region [A,B] that
satisfies the first-order optimality conditions = + +1z a bc zc b1[ ] ( [ ])( 2 )I I2 2 .
Otherwise, if F(·) is an arbitrary distribution, then the entire support
must be searched to find zI .
Proof. Please see Appendix C1.
Since + >b2 02 2 compared to the optimal decisions in
the centralized channel under DD with that under SD, we see that this
relationship depends on the sign of z[ ]I which may be negative or
positive depending on the randomness of demand (ξ). For example, if ξ
is modeled by E[ξ]= 0 then Λ[z] is less than or equal to zero for any
z A B[ , ], thus we have the flowing relationships: p p e e,IS ID IS ID
and IS ID. However, if ξ is always non-negative then Λ[z] ≥0 for any
z A B[ , ], thus we find that p p e e,IS ID IS ID and IS ID.
5.2. Decentralized channel under WP
The sequence of events under a WP in the SD are similar to that in
the DD but in the second stage, R decides the stocking quantity (or
equivalently, R's stocking factor of inventory) instead of using a
stocking quantity equal to demand. Therefore, the behavior of M and R
under WP in the SD can be described using M-Stackelberg setting as
follows: = +Stage E w w c z D1: Max [ ( , )] ( )( ) /2
w
m
WP
,
2
= + +Stage E p e z p D z w D z e2: Max [ ( , , )] ( [ ]) ( ) /2
p e z
r
WP
, ,
2
Through backward induction, the optimal equilibrium solution can
be reached for this game. However, it is difficult to find a closed form
solution. Therefore, we leave it to be resolved by a numerical method in
the next section.
5.3. Decentralized channel under sharing contracts
The sequence of events under the sharing contracts in the SD are
similar to that in the DD but in the second step, M decides stocking
quantity (or equivalently, the M's stocking factor of inventory) instead
of choosing a stocking quantity equal to demand. Let = +Q D z˜ [ ] be
the expected sales quantity and = =L z z E Max z˜ [ ] [ (0, )] be
the expected value of the leftover inventory (or unsold stock). After the
sharing fraction was chosen, the behavior of M and R under the sharing
contracts can be described using M-Stackelberg setting as follows:
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We solve the games by backward induction. In Table 4, we present
the first order optimality condition of M's expected profit function with
respect to the stocking factor of inventory under each sharing contract,
i.e., =E [ ]/ z 0mj from which M's optimal stocking factor of inventory
z∗j is determined corresponding to each sharing contract. We provide
the following theorem with regard to the uniqueness of M's optimal
stocking factor.
Theorem 2. In a decentralized channel with the sharing contracts in the SD,
the optimal stocking factor of inventory z*j that maximizes M’s expected
profit E [ ]mj , is unique in the region [A,B] determined by the first-order
optimality conditions =E [ ]/ z 0mj if the following conditions are
satisfied:
(a) F(·) is a distribution function satisfying the condition 2r(z)2 + dr(z)/
dz> 0 for z∈[A,B]
(b) + >a bc A 0
(c) The α∈(0.1) chosen assures positive profits for M in the DD, i.e.,> 0mj .
Proof. Please see the Appendix C2.
Remark 5. Condition (a) in Theorem 2 guarantees that =R z E( ) [ ]/ zj mj
is either monotone or unimodal which implies that R z( )j has at most two
roots. Moreover, > = <R z z B climit[ ( ), ] 0j for the OS contracts and> = <R z z B climit[ ( ), ] (1 ) 0j if 0<α< 1 for the AS contracts.
Therefore, if R z( )j has two roots, the larger of the two represents the
maximum and the smaller represents the minimum of E [ ]mj . On the other
hand, if R z( )j has only one root, we require that = >+R A( ) 0j a bc Aa bc2( )( ) mj2
(equivalently + >a bc A 0 and > 0mj ) then only one root of R z( )j
corresponds to the maximum of E [ ]mj .
Given M's optimal stocking factor of inventory, zj∗, we derive M's
optimal decisions on the retail price, CSR effort level and R's optimal
marketing effort level in Table 5. It is noteworthy that the optimal
decisions on retail price, CSR effort and marketing effort level under OS
contracts have the same expressions as those under the AS contracts.
The only difference is the selection of M's optimal stocking factor. From
the results in Table 5, we observe that the optimal decisions in the
RPMC AS contract are the same as those in the centralized channel.
Moreover, R's and M's expected profit functions under the RPMC AS
contract are linear functions of that of the centralized channel in the SD
(i.e., =E E[ ] [ ]rRPMC IS and =E E[ ] (1 ) [ ]mRPMC IS ). Therefore,
the channel members can arbitrarily allocate the maximized joint profit
by negotiating the sharing fraction under the RPMC contract. We then
arrive at the following conclusion in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. The RPMC AS contract leads to perfect coordination of the
channel and arbitrarily allocates coordinated profit among members in the
SD.
Remark 6. The first order optimality condition: =E [ ]/ z 0mj , (or
equivalently, =z Y1/ [ ] 1 " "j , then, the second term in this equation,
“Y”, is shown in Table 4.
6. Numerical examples under uniform distribution
In this Section, we conduct numerical studies to illustrate our results
for the SD case. Using the optimal decisions and profits in the equili-
brium, we show that for some ranges values of demand variability and
sharing fraction, the sharing contracts using the same sharing rules can
effectively coordinate the channel and bring the channel to Pareto
improvement. Also by changing the demand variability and sharing
fraction, we can evaluate the channel performance under sharing con-
tracts.
6.1. Experimental parameters
When deriving the equilibrium results for the SD case, we use the
benchmark parameter values as in Section 4.6. In addition, we choose
to model the randomness of market demand, ξ, using a uniform random
variable defined on the interval [-A, A], where A>0 is the upper
bound of the uniform distribution. Therefore,= = =+f x F x z( ) , ( ) , [ ]A x AA A zA12 2 ( )4 2 and =z A z A[ ] ( )/2 . The
variance of ξ which is measured by A /32 represents demand variability.
The higher the value of A, the greater the demand variability is. We
limit our analysis to scenarios where A < a-bc (equivalent A<71) in
order to ensure that demand is positive at p= c in the SD. We select the
results calculated by A=0, 20, 40 and 60 to simulate three levels of
demand variability. The case of A=0 is equivalent to the case of DD
(ξ=0).
Contract Stage Objective The OS contracts The AS contracts
RP Stage 1 Emax [ ]
p z
m
RP
, ,
p c Q cL( )(1 ) ˜ ˜ /22 p c Q cL( )(1 ) ˜ (1 ) ˜ /22
Stage 2 Emax [ ]
e
r
RP p c Q e( ) ˜ /22 p c Q cL e( ) ˜ ˜ /22
RPM Stage 1 Emax [ ]
p z
m
RPM
, ,
p c Q cL e( )(1 ) ˜ ˜ (1 ) /2 /22 2 p c Q cL e( )(1 ) ˜ (1 ) ˜ (1 ) /2 /22 2
Stage 2 Emax [ ]
e
r
RPM p c Q e( ) ˜ /22 p c Q cL e( ) ˜ ˜ /22
RPC Stage 1 Emax [ ]
p z
m
RPC
, ,
p c Q cL( )(1 ) ˜ ˜ (1 ) /22 p c Q cL( )(1 ) ˜ (1 ) ˜ (1 ) /22
Stage 2 Emax [ ]
e
r
RPC p c Q e( ) ˜ /2 /22 2 p c Q cL e( ) ˜ ˜ /2 /22 2
RPMC Stage 1 Emax [ ]
p z
m
RPMC
, ,
p c Q cL e( )(1 ) ˜ ˜ (1 ) /2 (1 ) /22 2 p c Q cL e( )(1 ) ˜ (1 ) ˜ (1 ) /2 (1 ) /22 2
Stage 2 Emax [ ]
e
r
RPMC p c Q e( ) ˜ /2 /22 2 p c Q cL e( ) ˜ ˜ /2 /22 2
Table 4
M's optimal stocking factor of inventory under sharing contracts.
Contract The OS contracts The AS contracts
RP ++ +a bc zc b(1 ) ( [ ])( 2 2 2 2 2) ++ +a bc zc b( [ ])( 2 2 2 2 2)
RPM ++ +a bc zc b(1 ) ( [ ])( 2 2 2 2) ++ +a bc zc b( [ ])( 2 2 2 2)
RPC ++a bc zc b(1 ) ( [ ])( 2 2 2 2) ++a bc zc b( [ ])( 2 2 2 2)
RPMC ++a bc zc b(1 ) ( [ ])( 2 2 2) ++a bc zc b( [ ])( 2 2 2)
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6.2. Two basic models: the centralized channel and decentralized channel
under WP
Table 6 gives the numerical example results for the optimal deci-
sions and the profit of the centralized channel with different demand
variances. Similarly, we compute the optimal decisions and the profit of
M and R under WP and present them in Table 7. The results of two
models serve as benchmarks for the evaluation of the performance of
sharing contracts.
From Tables 6 and 7, the stocking quantity, the marketing effort and
the CSR effort of the decentralized channel under WP are lower than
those of the centralized channel. These results lead to a lower profit for
whole channel under WP. As demand variability increases, the profit of
the decentralized channel under WP and that of the centralized channel
decrease because the channel tends to set a lower price with higher
level of demand variability. Moreover, the channel efficiency under WP
decreases with increasing in demand variability. In the next section, we
will demonstrate how the performance of channel can be altered if our
sharing contracts is adopted under the SD case.
6.3. The joint impact of demand variability and sharing fraction on channel
performance
Using the same procedure as in Section 4.6.1, we obtain the results
of mj , rj, Ej and the optimal decision of M on CSR effort level for the SD
case with two representative values of A (i.e., A=20, A=60) in
Table 8 (for the OS contracts) and Table 9 (for the AS contracts), the
computational results with A=40 is available from the authors.
6.3.1. The impact on M's profit and R's profit
Based on the computational results, we have the following ob-
servations with the SD case: (1) both R's and M's profit decrease with
demand variability in all sharing contracts at any value of sharing
fraction; (2) R's profit under the OS contract becomes concave in α (R's
profit first increases with α and then decreases with α when it passes a
certain threshold) while R's profit under the AS contract is always in-
creasing in α for any level of demand variability. This observation
implies that there exists a certain threshold at which R's profit is higher
under the AS contract than under the OS contract when the sharing
fraction exceeds this threshold. Thus R will have the incentive to share
the production cost of unsold stock only if the negotiated α is greater
than this threshold; (3) M's profit always decreases with α in both the
OS contract and the AS contract. However, the difference between the
m
j under the AS contract and that in the OS contract (i.e., )mj AS mj OS
is always positive and becomes concave in α (first increases in α, attains
the highest when the sharing fraction approaches a certain threshold,
approximately 50%, and then decreases in α). This implies that M al-
ways gets benefit when the retailer undertakes the production cost of
unsold products. Specifically, the AS contract is the most attractive for
M if the sharing fraction is moderate (neither too high nor too low).
For a more graphical look of these observations above, we provide
an example with the RPM contract in Figs. 4 and 5.
6.3.2. The impact on channel efficiency
The value of E j in Tables 8 and 9 provides us with the following
observations: (1) E j decreases as demand variability increases. (2) E j is
always higher in the AS contract than in the OS contract. The higher the
degree of the demand variability (large A) is, the greater the difference
of E j between the AS contract and the OS contract is. Furthermore, the
higher the value of sharing fraction is, the greater the difference of E j
between the AS contract and the OS contract is. This result suggests that
the channel will get more profit with the increase in demand variation
if R shares more production costs of unsold stock with M. We provide an
example of these observations above in Fig. 6. (3) The channel effi-
ciency under the RPMC AS contract is always equal to one (for all va-
lues of α and A). This finding illustrates that RPMC AS contract can
bring the channel full coordination regardless of the value of demand
variability (As we showed in Proposition 5). In contrast, the channel
Table 6
Optimal decisions for centralized channel when ξ∼U(-A, A).
Demand pI zI qI eI θI ΠI
A=0 26.275 48.825 18.309 10.172 577.765
A=20 25.574 4.359 54.138 17.520 9.733 454.890
A=40 24.782 7.719 58.569 16.620 9.238 334.310
A=60 23.859 9.704 61.819 15.590 8.661 216.510
Table 7
The optimal decisions under WP when ξ∼U(-A, A).
Demand w θ p z q e M's profit R's profit channel's profit E
A=0 22.624 4.746 30.218 22.781 8.543 269.572 143.796 413.368 0.715
A=20 19.050 4.400 26.679 −8.560 33.088 8.583 206.488 114.010 320.498 0.705
A=40 16.100 3.900 23.768 −14.180 41.360 8.627 153.632 79.614 233.246 0.698
A=60 13.950 3.950 21.569 −17.600 47.958 8.572 107.431 40.338 147.770 0.683
Table 5
The difference of the optimal decisions under sharing contracts between two cases of SD and DD.
Contract Retail price Marketing effort level CSR effort level
RP + +zb [ ]2 2 2 2 2 + +zb [ ]2 2 2 2 2 + +zb(1 ) [ ]2 2 2 2 2
RPM + +zb [ ]2 2 2 2 + +zb [ ]2 2 2 2 + +zb(1 ) [ ]2 2 2 2
RPC + zb[ ]2 2 2 2 + zb[ ]2 2 2 2 + zb[ ]2 2 2 2
RPMC + zb[ ]2 2 2 + zb[ ]2 2 2 + zb[ ]2 2 2
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efficiency of the RPMC OS contract is less than one for all positive
values of A. This finding also implies that the RPMC OS contract does
not coordinate the channel under demand uncertainty. The investiga-
tion of channel efficiency does not allow the question of whether the
sharing contract is attractive for M and R to be answered. Therefore, in
the following section, we will show that whether the sharing contracts
proposed can bring the channel to Pareto improvement when the de-
mand is uncertain.
6.4. The Pareto improvements and CSR-performance
Because we cannot describe closed form solutions for the Pareto-
improving region of α in the SD case, we highlight the values of mj , rj
corresponding to the value of α which guarantees both > 0mj , > 0rj
in Tables 8 and 9 We find that the Pareto-improving region always
exists with the AS contracts at any levels of demand variability.
Namely, when A=20 then > 0mj , > 0rj for j=RP, RPM, RPC and
RPMC at α=0.3, 0.4 and 0.5; when A=40 then > 0mRP , > 0rRP at
Table 8
Computational results of the OS contracts for the SD case.
A α RP RPM RPC RPMC
Υm Υr E θ Υm Υr E θ Υm Υr E θ Υm Υr E θ
A=20 0.01 0.71 −0.96 0.79 7.73 1.17 −0.95 1.00 9.62 0.71 −0.96 0.79 7.82 1.18 −0.96 0.99 9.73
0.1 0.57 −0.59 0.82 7.16 0.92 −0.49 1.00 8.57 0.60 −0.63 0.82 8.06 0.95 −0.57 0.99 9.67
0.2 0.41 −0.20 0.84 6.50 0.64 −0.03 0.99 7.45 0.46 −0.26 0.85 8.34 0.70 −0.15 0.98 9.59
0.3 0.25 0.17 0.86 5.79 0.38 0.38 0.97 6.35 0.31 0.12 0.87 8.63 0.45 0.22 0.97 9.50
0.4 0.08 0.52 0.87 5.05 0.13 0.74 0.95 5.30 0.15 0.49 0.89 8.93 0.21 0.56 0.94 9.38
0.5 −0.10 0.84 0.87 4.27 −0.10 1.05 0.92 4.27 −0.02 0.84 0.90 9.22 −0.02 0.83 0.90 9.22
0.6 −0.28 1.10 0.85 3.46 −0.32 1.28 0.88 3.29 −0.21 1.16 0.90 9.51 −0.25 1.01 0.84 9.02
0.7 −0.47 1.29 0.82 2.60 −0.52 1.43 0.83 2.36 −0.40 1.44 0.89 9.75 −0.46 1.05 0.76 8.75
0.8 −0.65 1.39 0.76 1.72 −0.70 1.49 0.76 1.49 −0.60 1.60 0.83 9.90 −0.66 0.92 0.63 8.39
0.9 −0.83 1.35 0.66 0.84 −0.86 1.45 0.68 0.70 −0.80 1.60 0.74 9.87 −0.84 0.50 0.45 7.91
0.99 −0.98 1.18 0.55 0.08 −0.99 1.31 0.59 0.06 −0.98 1.42 0.62 9.57 −0.99 0.10 0.28 7.37
A=60 0.01 0.30 −0.92 0.66 6.54 0.97 −0.88 1.00 8.54 0.30 −0.93 0.66 6.62 0.98 −0.90 0.99 8.64
0.1 0.11 −0.21 0.70 5.93 0.59 0.08 0.99 7.43 0.14 −0.28 0.70 6.70 0.64 −0.02 0.99 8.41
0.2 −0.09 0.46 0.72 5.22 0.21 0.92 0.96 6.24 −0.04 0.38 0.74 6.76 0.28 0.82 0.97 8.10
0.3 −0.29 0.97 0.72 4.47 −0.13 1.49 0.89 5.07 −0.22 0.94 0.75 6.76 −0.04 1.46 0.93 7.69
0.4 −0.47 1.28 0.69 3.68 −0.42 1.72 0.80 3.94 −0.40 1.35 0.73 6.67 −0.33 1.83 0.86 7.15
0.5 −0.64 1.33 0.61 2.86 −0.64 1.58 0.66 2.86 −0.57 1.52 0.68 6.42 −0.57 1.85 0.74 6.42
0.6 −0.78 1.05 0.49 2.03 −0.80 1.08 0.49 1.87 −0.73 1.38 0.58 5.93 −0.76 1.46 0.58 5.44
0.7 −0.88 0.51 0.34 1.25 −0.90 0.38 0.31 1.06 −0.85 0.87 0.42 5.10 −0.88 0.74 0.38 4.23
0.8 −0.95 −0.09 0.20 0.63 −0.96 −0.19 0.17 0.50 −0.93 0.16 0.25 3.94 −0.95 0.02 0.21 3.03
0.9 −0.98 −0.50 0.10 0.23 −0.99 −0.53 0.10 0.18 −0.98 −0.40 0.12 2.83 −0.98 −0.43 0.11 2.13
0.99 −1.00 −0.70 0.06 0.02 −1.00 −0.69 0.06 0.01 −1.00 −0.67 0.06 2.11 −1.00 −0.64 0.07 1.62
Table 9
Computational results of the AS contracts for the SD case.
A α RP RPM RPC RPMC
Υm Υr E θ Υm Υr E θ Υm Υr E θ Υm Υr E θ
A=20 0.01 0.71 −0.96 0.79 7.74 1.18 −0.95 1.00 9.62 0.72 −0.97 0.79 7.83 1.18 −0.96 1.00 9.73
0.1 0.60 −0.64 0.82 7.22 0.95 −0.55 1.00 8.63 0.63 −0.68 0.82 8.12 0.98 −0.60 1.00 9.73
0.2 0.47 −0.29 0.85 6.60 0.71 −0.13 0.99 7.56 0.51 −0.35 0.85 8.48 0.76 −0.20 1.00 9.73
0.3 0.33 0.06 0.87 5.95 0.47 0.27 0.98 6.52 0.39 0.00 0.88 8.86 0.54 0.20 1.00 9.73
0.4 0.18 0.41 0.89 5.26 0.24 0.64 0.97 5.51 0.25 0.36 0.91 9.28 0.32 0.60 1.00 9.73
0.5 0.02 0.75 0.90 4.52 0.02 0.98 0.96 4.52 0.10 0.73 0.93 9.73 0.10 0.99 1.00 9.73
0.6 −0.16 1.08 0.90 3.74 −0.20 1.31 0.94 3.57 −0.07 1.10 0.95 10.23 −0.12 1.39 1.00 9.73
0.7 −0.34 1.39 0.90 2.90 −0.41 1.61 0.92 2.64 −0.26 1.48 0.96 10.78 −0.34 1.79 1.00 9.73
0.8 −0.55 1.67 0.88 2.00 −0.61 1.90 0.90 1.74 −0.48 1.85 0.95 11.40 −0.56 2.19 1.00 9.73
0.9 −0.76 1.92 0.84 1.04 −0.81 2.16 0.88 0.86 −0.72 2.21 0.93 12.08 −0.78 2.59 1.00 9.73
0.99 −0.98 2.12 0.79 0.11 −0.98 2.39 0.86 0.08 −0.97 2.51 0.89 12.76 −0.98 2.95 1.00 9.73
A=60 0.01 0.31 −0.96 0.66 6.56 0.99 −0.93 1.00 8.56 0.32 −0.96 0.66 6.64 1.00 −0.95 1.00 8.66
0.1 0.26 −0.56 0.71 6.16 0.76 −0.35 1.00 7.66 0.29 −0.63 0.71 6.95 0.81 −0.46 1.00 8.66
0.2 0.18 −0.12 0.75 5.68 0.53 0.24 0.99 6.69 0.24 −0.24 0.76 7.33 0.61 0.07 1.00 8.66
0.3 0.10 0.32 0.79 5.15 0.30 0.76 0.97 5.75 0.18 0.18 0.81 7.74 0.41 0.61 1.00 8.66
0.4 −0.01 0.74 0.82 4.58 0.08 1.24 0.95 4.84 0.11 0.62 0.85 8.18 0.21 1.15 1.00 8.66
0.5 −0.12 1.15 0.84 3.97 −0.12 1.65 0.93 3.97 0.01 1.08 0.89 8.66 0.01 1.68 1.00 8.66
0.6 −0.25 1.52 0.84 3.30 −0.31 2.03 0.90 3.12 −0.12 1.55 0.91 9.19 −0.19 2.22 1.00 8.66
0.7 −0.40 1.85 0.83 2.57 −0.50 2.36 0.87 2.30 −0.27 2.02 0.92 9.77 −0.40 2.76 1.00 8.66
0.8 −0.58 2.12 0.79 1.79 −0.67 2.64 0.84 1.51 −0.47 2.47 0.91 10.41 −0.60 3.29 1.00 8.66
0.9 −0.77 2.30 0.73 0.93 −0.84 2.89 0.80 0.74 −0.71 2.85 0.86 11.12 −0.80 3.83 1.00 8.66
0.99 −0.98 2.37 0.64 0.10 −0.98 3.09 0.77 0.07 −0.97 3.12 0.78 11.83 −0.98 4.31 1.00 8.66
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α=0.3 and 0.4, > 0mRPM , > 0rRPM at α= 0.3 and 0.4, > 0mRPC ,> 0rRPC at α= 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5, > 0mRPMC , > 0rRPMC at α= 0.3, 0.4
and 0.5; when A=60 then > 0mRP , > 0rRP at α= 0.3; > 0mRPM ,> 0rRPM at α=0.2, 0.3 and 0.4; > 0mRPC , > 0rRPC at α= 0.3, 0.4
and 0.5; > 0mRPMC , > 0rRPMC at α= 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5. In contrast,
the OS contract is not always a Pareto-improving solution when the
demand variability is relatively large. Namely, when A=20, all four
OS contracts guarantee a Pareto improvement at α= 0.2 and 0.3; when
A=40 then > 0mRP , > 0rRP at α=0.3, > 0mRPM , > 0rRPM at
α= 0.2 and 0.3, > 0mRPC , > 0rRPC at α= 0.3, > 0mRPMC , > 0rRPMC
at α= 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5. However, when the demand is extremely un-
certain, (A=60), we can't find the value of α creating Pareto-im-
proving solutions under the RP OS contract and the RPM OS contract.
Regarding the CSR performance, we also observed that when the
sharing faction was chosen to lead to a win-win outcome, the CSR
performance under the sharing contract is higher than those under WP.
For more insight of the movement of the Pareto-improving region with
the demand variability, we note that the labels of ¯
j are intersection
points between rj and horizontal axis (if it has two points, the smaller
of the two represents ¯
j) in Fig. 7. Similarly, we note that the labels of
¯ j are the intersection points between mj and the horizontal axis in
Fig. 8. From the observation of ¯
j and ¯ j, the lower and upper bounds of
the Pareto-improving region move in the same directions. That is, the
Pareto-improving region under the sharing contract j (¯ , ¯ )
j j shifts to
the left as demand uncertainty increases. However, the Pareto-im-
proving region under the AS contracts shifts to the left and is relatively
small and less than that under the OS contracts.
7. Conclusion and perspectives
In this paper, we studied the channel coordination and cooperation
issues when the channel members make different decisions to promote
the market demand including marketing and CSR efforts. We study a
two-echelon channel in the condition that the market demand is
Fig. 4. (a) rRPM AS , (b) rRPM OS , (c) rRPM AS rRPM OS changes with A and α.
Fig. 5. (a) mRPM AS , (b) mRPM OS , (c) mRPM AS mRPM OS changes with A and α.
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stochastic and affected by R's marketing effort, retail price and M's CSR
effort. These complex settings represent a realistic business practices for
firms dealing with channel coordination issues for the different deci-
sions impacting on the channel performance including not only the
operational choices (quantity, price) and marketing strategy of the
firms but also the sustainable channel management. Therefore, we in-
tegrate M's CSR and R's marketing efforts into the coordination of VMI-
CC and propose the coordination schemes for the chain through the
combination of revenue sharing and cost sharing contracts. Under some
assumptions on demand and cost function, we prove that our proposed
sharing contracts can simultaneously achieve the following objectives:
(1) improve CSR performance; (2) increase total channel profits; (3)
ensure that each partner in the channel can benefit from the proposed
contracts. Therefore, the coordination between M and R in a VMI-CC
via sharing contracts may lead to both higher profit and higher CSR
performance. Furthermore, we found that the channel can be
coordinated perfectly regardless of demand uncertainty only if R and M
share all of the marketing cost, CSR investment cost and production cost
of the entire consignment stock.
From managerial insights, our research helps decision-makers to
propose the different coordination strategies to improve the channel
performance in the short and long term. In terms of the short-term
contracts, our findings suggest that the channel's members can avoid
profit loss by adopting a VMI-CC with a revenue and cost sharing
agreement. In the long term, many sources can lead to instability in
product demand such as new products and changes in technological and
economic conditions; this uncertainty may have to be taken into con-
sideration when making strategic decisions. Our results show that in
order to attract the highest profit under demand uncertainty, the
channel's members should share all channel costs including the pro-
duction costs of unsold stocks. Furthermore, CSR implementation in the
channel is indispensable to achieve sustainable development and the
Fig. 6. (a) ERPC AS, (b) ERPC OS, (c) E ERPC AS RPC OS, changes with A and α.
Fig. 7. The upper bound of Pareto-improving region in the RPC AS contract (a) and the RPC OS contract (b).
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incentives are important factors in maintaining a long-term relationship
of channel CSR collaboration. With our sharing contracts, the channel
can increase CSR implementation to meet the expectation of consumers
while optimizing their economic performances.
Finally, our current model can potentially be extended in some di-
rections. First, that would be more interesting if the mutual impact of
marketing and CSR efforts on the consumers' behavior is taken into
consideration. In fact, the potential customer value creation of CSR
activities (i.e., self-benefit value and societal benefit value) depends not
only on the CSR investment cost but also on type of product and the
interactions between firms and customers through marketing strategy.
Therefore, future research can examine the case that the marginal effect
of CSR effort on demand depends on the marketing strategy (i.e., ad-
vertising effort level and advertising appeals) and/or type of product.
Second, since the capital constraints are a great challenge for many
firms in the real world, as another opportunity for future investigation
to delve into our sharing contracts with a VMI-CC where the capital
constraints exist. Last but not least researchers can explore the cases of
asymmetric information. For example, the cost of CSR efforts is the
private information of M whereas R can be more knowledgeable about
the cost of exerting marketing effort and the demand. These complex-
ities will affect the strategic interaction between the two firms and how
to coordinate a VMI-CC with the combination of Revenue - Cost and
Information sharing in order to achieve the best performance of the
channel will become an important and attractive issue.
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Appendix A. Proof of Tables
We only provide Proof for RP contract, the proofs for other contracts are the same logic.
A1. Proof of Tables 1 and 2
The results in Table 1 and Table 2 for the cases of centralized channel and wholesale price contract are the same as those in the paper of P. Ma
et al. (2013). We provide only proofs for the sharing contract (The proofs for the sharing contracts RPM, RPC, RPMC is conducted according to the
same process. We omit the details of proofs). By backward sequential decision-making approach, we first analyze the optimal decision of the retailer,
and then derive the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer. When the demand is deterministic, the retailer's profit under the RP contract can be
expressed as = + +p c a bp e( ) ( )rRP e22 . The first order derivatives of rRP with respect to e and set it to zero yield = p c( ) . Sub-
stituting e into the Manufacturer's profit function, i.e., = + +p c a bp e( )(1 )( )mRP 22 . We have,= + +( )p c a bp( )(1 )mRP p c( ) 22 2 . The first order derivatives of mRP with respect to p and θ as follows:
= + + +
p
p c b a bp p c( )(1 ) (1 ) ( ) .m
RP 2 2
= p c( )(1 ) .mRP
The Hessian matrix of mRP is = ( )b2(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
p p
p
mRP mRP
m
RP
m
RP
2
2
2
2 2
2
2
.
The Hessian matrix of mRP is a negative definite for all values of p and θ if η > 0 and + <b2 2 02 2 2 .
Solving = 0pmRP and = 0mRP yields:
Fig. 8. The lower bound of Pareto-improving region in the RPC AS contract (a) and the RPC OS contract (b).
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= + + ++ = ++p c a bc c cb a bc a bcb2 2 2 , 2 22 2 22 2 2 2 2 2
After simplification, we have = + + +p c a bcb( )2 22 2 2 and = + +a bcb( )(1 )2 22 2 2 .
By substituting p, the marketing effort level becomes =e a bcb ( )4 2 2 2 .
Substituting p, θ and e into the profit function of retailer, manufacturer and channel, we obtain
=
= ++ +
;
;
r
RP a bc b
b
m
RP a bc
b
( ) (2 3 )
2(2 2 )
( ) (1 )
4 4 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2
and = ++ .cRP a bc b b( ) ((2 ) 2 ( ) ( ))2(2 2 )2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2
A2. Proof of Tables 4 and 5
When the demand is stochastic, the retailer's expected profit under the RP contract can be expressed as= + + +E p c a bp e z[ ] ( ) ( [ ])rRP e22 .
Taking the first derivative of E [ ]rRP with respect to e and making them equal to zero, yield
=e p c( ) .
By plugging e into M's expected profit, we obtain
= + + +E p c a bp p c z c z z[ ] 1 ( ) [ ] ( [ ])
2
.mRP
2 2
Taking the first derivative of E [ ]mRP with respect to p and θ:
= + + +E p p c a bp p c z c z z[ ]/ ( )(1 ) ( ) [ ] ( [ ])
2m
RP
2 2
and = p c( )(1 )E [ ]mRP .
Solving the first order optimality condition = = 0E p E[ ] [ ]mRP mRP , implies that= + + + ++ +p c a bc c c zb2 [ ]2 2 ,RPS 2 2 22 2 2
= + ++ +a bc zb( 1 ) ( [ ])2 2 .RPS 2 2 2
Substituting the optimal pRPS into the optimal marketing effort level, then
= ++e a bc zb( [ ])2 2 .RPS 2 2 2
Recall that = + + ++pRPD c a bc c cb2 2 22 2 22 2 2 , = + +RPD a bcb( )(1 )2 22 2 2 .and = + +eRPD a bcb( )2 22 2 2
After rearranging, we obtain
= + +p p zb [ ]2 2 ,RPS RPD 2 2 2
= + +zb(1 ) [ ]2 2 ,RPS RPD 2 2 2
= + +e e zb [ ]2 2 ,RPS RPD 2 2 2
Substituting the optimal p ,RPS RPS into the Manufacturer's profit function and taking the first derivative of E [ ]mRP with respect to z we have
= + + + ++E z a c b b z zb c[ ] ( ( 1) ( 2 ) ( 1) [ ]) [ ]2 2mRP 2 2 22 2 2
By setting = 0E z[ ]mRP , the optimal stocking factor of inventory z∈(A, B) satisfying= ++ + +z c bc c cc a bc a bc c c z z[ ] 2 22 [ ] [ ] .2 2 22 2 2
After rearranging, we obtain. = ++ +1 .z a bc zc b1[ ] (1 ) ( [ ])( 2 2 )2 2 2
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Appendix B. Analytical results for channel performance in the DD
B1. Analyze the impact of α on the channel member's profit
From the result in Table 2, ij is a function of α. Moreover, the Manufacturer's profit and retailer's profit are independent of α under wholesale
price contract. Thus, the impact of α on the Manufacturer's profit (the retailer's profit) under the sharing contract j is the same impact of α on mj ( rj).
By examining the sign of the functions = /i j ij with the conditions of > 0i j , we summarize the impact of α on the profit of the manufacturer
and the retailer in each sharing contract through properties 1–8 as follows:
Property 1. In the RP contract,
(1) = + +mRP bb2(2 1)( )2 2 22 2 2 ; = ++mRP b bb2( ) (2 4 )(2 2 )2 2 22 2 2 2 ,
(2) When < <b22 2 then > 0mRP if < <0 b23 2 , > 0mRP if < <1/2 b23 2 ,
(3) When >b 2 then < 0mRP if < <0 1, > 0mRP if < <0 1/2.
Property 1 shows that when >b 2 the manufacturer’s profit decreases in α for any α in the range of (0,1) and the manufacturer prefers the RP contract to
wholesale price contract if the sharing fraction is less than 50%. This also implies that if the manufacturer has more the contractual power than the retailer, he
will choose a sharing fraction approach to zero to attain the highest profit. In this case, the manufacturer’s profit increases at most = > 0mRP bb2( )2 2 2
compared with that of the wholesale price. Conversely, when <b 2 the manufacturer’s profit increases in α for any α in the range of ( )0, b23 2 . Thus, the
manufacturer choose α approach to b2
3 2
to attain the highest profit. However, the manufacturer prefers the RP contract to wholesale price contract only if the
sharing fraction is higher than 50% in this situation.
Property 2. In the RPM contract,
(1) = ++ + +mRPM bb( 1 2 )( 2 )(2 ( 1 ) )22 2 ; = ++ +mRPM b bb( 2 ) (2 4 )( ( 2 ( 1 ) ))2 2 22 2 2 .
(2) When >b 22 and > ¯ then < 0mRPM for any < <0 1 and > 0mRPM if < <0 1/2.
Property 2 shows that the profit of the manufacturer always decreases in α under the RPM contract and the manufacturer prefers the RPM contract to
wholesale price contract if the sharing fraction is less than 50%. Furthermore, the Manufacturer’s profit in the RPM contract always decreases with α.
Therefore, the manufacturer attains the highest profit if the sharing fraction approach to zero. In this case, the manufacturer’s profit increases by at most= >+ 0mRPM bb( 2 )222 2 versus the wholesale price contract.
Property 3. In the RPC contract,
(1) = + ++ ;mRPC bb2(2 1) ( (2 4 ) )2 22 22 2 = + ++ .mRPC b b bb4 4 (3 ) (8 6 )(2 2 )4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 42 2 2
(2) When >b 22 and < <b b2 222 2 2 2 then > 0mRPC if < <0 b2 3 22 .
(3) When >b 22 and <b b22 322 2 2 2 then < 0mRPC if < <0 b2 3 22 .
(4) When >b 22 and > b32 2 2 then < 0mRPC if < <0 1.
From the Property 3, it’s seen that the optimal sharing fraction which maximizes the Manufacturer’s profit in the RPC contract depends on the value of the
coefficient of marketing effort cost. When is higher than a threshold level, i.e., =
b
3
2
2
2 the smaller the selection of α, the more profits the manufacturer
gets. This implies that the manufacturer attains the highest profit if the sharing fraction approach to zero. Otherwise, the manufacturer should raise the sharing
fraction α approach to b2
3
2
2 to attract the highest profit.
Property 4. In the RPMC contract,
(1) = + ++ ;mRPCM bb(2 1) ( (2 4 ) )22 22 2 = ++ .mRPMC bb2 422 22 2
(2) When >b 22 and > ¯ then < 0mRPMC if < <0 1.
Property 4 show that the Manufacturer’s profit in the RPMC contract always decreases in α. Therefore, the manufacturer attains the highest profit if the
sharing fraction approach to zero.
We next show the impacts of the value of α on retailer’s profit through properties 5-8 as follows
Property 5. In the RP contract, let = +rRP b bb b24 32 22 2 2 2 , =ˆ bb b3 24 22 2 22 2 , we have
(1) = ++ + +rRP bb bb bb(2 4 )2 (2 3 )(2 2 ) 2(2 4 )2 2 22 22 2 2 2 22 2 2
(2) = + + + ++rRP b b bb b2 (2 4 ) (2 3 (4 ))( 2 )(2 2 )2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 3
(3) When < b22 2and > ¯ then > 0rRP if < <0 rRP, < 0rRP if < < 1rRP ,
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(4) < bWhen 22 2and > ¯ then > 0rRP if < <0 rRP; < 0rRP if < <rRP b23 2 ,
(5) < <bWhen 2 32 2 and <¯ ˆ then > 0rRP if < <0 rRP , < 0rRP if < < 1rRP ,
(6) When >b 2 2and > ˆ then > 0rRP if < <0 1,
(7) When b 3 2 and < <¯ ˆ then > 0rRP if < <0 rRP ; < 0rRP if < < 1rRP .
Property 5 shows that the optimal sharing fraction which maximizes the retailer’s profit in the RP contract depends on the value of the coefficient of CSR
effort cost. As the coefficient of CSR effort cost is higher than a threshold level, ie. > ˆ, the retailer increases the sharing fraction approach to one to attract
the highest profit. This suggest that the retailer should incur most of the production costs and extract most of the channel sales to maximize her profit. On the
other hand, the retailer attains the highest profit if the sharing fraction approach to rRP.
Property 6. In the RPM contract, let = +rRPM b22 22 , we have
(1) = + + + ++ + ,rRPM b b bb(4 1) 2 (2 (4 1) (1 3 ) ) (4 (4 1) 4 (1 3 ) (1 3 ) )( ( 2 ( 1 ) ))4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 42 2 2
(2) = + + + + ++ + ,rRPM b bb(2 ( 4 )) ( ( 2 (1 ) ))( ( 2 ( 1 ) ))2 2 2 2 22 2 3
(3) When >b 22and <¯ 2¯ then > 0rRPM if < <0 rRPM ; < 0rRPM , if < < 1rRPM ,
(4) When >b 2 2 and > 2¯ then > 0rRPM if < <0 1.
Property 6 indicates that the optimal sharing fraction which maximizes the retailer’s profit in the RPM contract depends on the value of the coefficient of
CSR effort cost. As the coefficient of CSR effort cost is higher than a threshold level, i.e, = 2¯ , the retailer increases the value of approach to one attract thehighest profit. Conversely, the retailer is raising the fraction of approach to rRPM to maximize her profit.
Property 7. In the RPC contract,
(1) = + + + ++ +rRPC b b bb bb(2 4 )( 2 ) ( 2 )(2 4 ) (3 ( 2 ))(2 ( 2 ))2 2 22 22 2 2 2 22 2 2
(2) = + ++ +rRPC b b bb b(2 )( 4 2 )(2 4 )( 2 ) (2 ( 2 ))2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 3
(3) When >b 22 and <b b2 422 2 2 2 then > 0rRPC if < <0 b2 4 22
(4) When >b 22and > b42 2 2 then > 0rRPC if < <0 1
(5) When >b 22and <b b2 322 2 2 2 then > 0rRPC if < <b b2 4 2 322 22
(6) When >b 22and < <b b32 422 2 2 2 then < 0rRPC if < < 1b2 4 22
The same logic as Property 6, Property 7 shows that the optimal sharing fraction which maximizes the retailer’s profit in the RPC contract depends on the
value of the coefficient of marketing effort cost. As the coefficient of marketing effort cost is higher than a threshold level, i.e, =
b
4
2
2
2 , the retailer increases
the value of α approach to one to attract more profit, the retailer’s profit increases at most = ++ + + ++ +rRPC b b bb bb(2 4 )( 2 ) ( 2 )(2 ( 4 )) 3 2(2 ( 2 ))2 2 22 22 2 2 2 22 2 2 .
On the contrary, the retailer is raising the fraction of approach to b2
4
2
2 to attain the highest profit.
Property 8. In the RPMC contract,
(1) = + + ++rRPMC b b bb b(4 1) (4 1) (4 ) (4 (4 1) 2 (1 4 ) )( 2 ) ( 2 )4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 42 2 2
(2) = + +rRPMC bb b(2 4 )( 2 ) ( 2 )2 2 22 2 2
(3) > 0rRPMC for any < <0 1
Property 8 show that the retailer’s profit in the RPMC contract always increases in α. Therefore, the retailer attains the highest profit if the sharing fraction
approach to one.
B2. Analyzing the impact of α on the channel’s profit
Since the profit of the centralized channel are independent of α and the channel efficiency of the sharing contract as function of α, ie., =E E ( )j j .
Therefore, the impact of α on the channel efficiency of the sharing contract is the same impact of α on the profit of channel in the decentralized. By examining
the sign of the functions = E ( )/cj j with the conditions of > 0i j , we summarize the impact of α on the profit of channel in the decentralized system
through properties 9-12 as follows:
Property 9. In the decentralized channel with RP contract, let = + +cRP bb b22 2 4 22 2 24 2 2 2 2 2 , we have
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(1) = + + + + + ++ERP b b b( ( 2 ))( ( 2 ) 2 ( ) ( ))(2 2 )2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2
(2) = + + + + + ++cRP b b b bb2 ( ( 2 ))( ( 2 ) 2 ( ( 2 )))(2 2 )2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 22 2 2 3
(3) When >b 22 and > ¯ then, > 0cRP if < <0 cRP
(4) When < b2 322 2 and > ¯ then < 0cRP if < <cRP b23 2
(5) When >b 32 2 and > ¯ then < 0cRP if < < 1cRP
(6) = = + + + ++ +E ERP maxRP b b bb b( 2 (2 3 ))( ( 2 ))(2 )( 3 2 ( ))4 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 when cRP and <E 1maxRP .
Property 9 shows that the decentralized channel with RP contract generate the highest profit when the sharing fraction is chosen at cRP. Furthermore, the
profit of decentralized channel in the RP contract is always less than the profit of the centralized channel.
Property 10. In the decentralized channel with the RPM contract,
(1) = + + + + ++ +ERPM b bb( ( 2 ))( ( 2 ( 1 ) ))( ( 2 ( 1 ) ))2 2 2 2 22 2 2
(2) = ++ +cRPM b bb2 ( 2 ) ( 2 )( ( 2 ( 1 ) ))2 2 2 22 2 3
(3) When >b 22 and > ¯ then < 0cRPM if < <0 1
(4) = =E E when1 0RPM maxRPM ,
(5) = = >+E E 0RPM minRPM b b2 22 22 when 1
Property 10 shows that the channel efficiency in RPM contract always decreases in α, approaches to one as α approaches to zero, approaches to EminRPM as α
approaches to one. This imply that the channel efficiency of RPM contract is the highest when the manufacturer incurs all of the cost and extracts all of the
channel profit. On the other hand, the decentralized channel generate the lowest profit when the retailer incurs all of the production and marketing cost.
Property 11. In the decentralized channel with RPC contract, let = +cRPC b b22 2 22 2 , we have
(1) = + + + + ++ +ERPC b bb( ( 2 ))(2 ( 2 ))(2 ( 2 ))2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2
(2) = + + + + ++ +cRPC b b bb2 ( ( 2 ))( ( 2 ) (2 2 ))(2 ( 2 ))2 2 2 2 2 22 2 3
(3) When >b 22 and > b2 2 2 then > 0cRPC if < <0 cRPC
(4) When >b 22 and <b b2 322 2 2 2 then < 0cRPC if < <cRPC b2 3 22
(5) When >b 22 and > b32 2 2 then < 0cRPC if < < 1cRPC
(6) = = +E E 1 whenRPC MaxRPC b cRPC( 2 )4 22 2 2 and <E 1MaxRPC
Property 11 shows that the decentralized channel with RPC contract generate the highest profit when the sharing fraction is chosen at cRPC. However, the
profit of decentralized channel in the RPC contract is always less than the profit of the centralized channel.
Property 12. In the RPCM contract, =E 1RPMC and = 0cRPMC for any < <0 1.
Property 12 shows that the decentralized channel with RPMC contract generates the same profit as that in the centralized channel and the channel
efficiency of RPMC contract does not depend on the selection of the sharing fraction.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem
C.1. Proof of Theorem 1
When the demand is stochastic, the expected profit of the centralized channel in Eq. (2) can be expressed as:
= + + + + + +E p a bp e z c a bp e z e[ ] ( [ ]) ( )
2 2I
S
2 2
First, for any fixed z with A ≤z ≤ B, and after taking the first derivative of E [ ]IS with respect to p, e and θ, we have
=E p c[ ] ( ) .IS
= + + +E
p
a bp b p c e z[ ] ( ) [ ].I
S
=E
e
p c e[ ] ( ) .I
S
Solving the first order optimality condition = = = 0E E p E e[ ] [ ] [ ]IS IS IS implies that
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= + + ++ = + +p z c a bc c zb p zb( ) [ ]2 [ ]2 ,IS ID2 22 2 2 2
= + + = + +z a bc zb zb( ) ( [ ])2 [ ]2 .IS ID2 2 2 2
= + + = + +e z a bc zb e zb( ) ( [ ])2 [ ]2 .IS ID2 2 2 2
Substituting the optimal p e, ,IS IS IS into the Eq. (2), we can reduce the objective function to one variable, z.
= = + + + + + ++ +E E z a b c c z ab bz z a c b z zb[ ] [ ( )] 2 ( 2 ) 2( ( )) [ ] [ ]2( ( 2 ))IS I 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2
Taking the first derivative of E z[ ( )]I with respect to z, we have
= + ++ +E zz a c b z zb c[ ( )] ( ( ) [ ]) [ ]( 2 )I 2 22 2
By setting = 0E z[ ( )]zI , the optimal stocking factor of inventory zI∈(A, B) satisfying= ++ + +z c bc cc a bc a bc c z z[ ] 2 [ ] [ ] .2 22 2
After rearranging, we obtain = ++ +1z a bc zc b1[ ] ( [ ])( ( 2 ))I c2 2 .
To identify that the values of z satisfy the first order optimality condition, let =R z( ) E zz[ ( )]I and consider finding the zero of R(z)
= + ++ +dR z dz z c a bc c z zb( )/ [ ] ( [ ]) [ ]( 2 ) .2 2 2 ''2 2
= + ++ +d R zdz z z c a bc c z zb( ) 3 [ ] [ ] ( [ ]) [ ]( 2 )2 2 '' 2 2 (3)2 2 , where =z[ ] zz(3) [ ]3 3 .
When = 0dR zdz( ) then = + + +z[ ] zc a bc c z'' [ ] [ ]22 2 , it follows that
= + ++ += + + +d R zdz
c a bc c z z
b
( ) ( [ ]) [ ]
( 2 )
.
dR z
dz
z
c a bc c z2
2 ( ) 0
3 [ ]
[ ]
2 2 (3)
2 2
2 2 3
2 2
and after simplification, we obtain
= + +=d R zdz b zz zz zz( ) ( 2 ) [ ][ ] 3 [ ][ ] [ ][ ] .dR zdz
2
2 ( ) 0
2 2
3
''
'' 2
2
(3)
Note that = + r z2 [ ]z
z
z
z
dr z
dz
3 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
( ) 2
2
2
(3) . Then,
= + + +=d R zdz b zz dr zdz r z( ) ( 2 ) [ ][ ] ( ) 2 [ ] .dR zdz
2
2 ( ) 0
2 2
3
''
2
Since = >z F z[ ] 1 ( ) 0, = <z f z[ ] ( ) 0'' and >+ 0b22 2 . Therefore,<= 0d R zdz( ) 0dR zdz
2
2 ( )
if + >r z2 [ ] 0dr zdz( ) 2 then it follows that R(z) is either monotone or unimodal, which implies that R(z) has at most two roots.
Also, > = <R z z B cLimit[ ( ), ] 0. Therefore, if R(z) has only one root, it corresponds to the maximum of E z[ ( )]I ; if it has two roots, the larger
of the two represents the maximum and the smaller represents the minimum of E z[ ( )]I and we denote it by zI. if R z( ) has only one root, we require
that = >++R A( ) 0a bc Ab( )22 2 or equivalently + >a bc A 0 and + b22 2.
C2. Proof of Theorem 2
We provide Proof for RP contract, the proofs for other contracts are the same logic.
To identify that the values of z satisfy the first order optimality condition, = 0E z[ ]mRP , let =R z( )RP E z[ ]mRP and consider finding the zero of R z( )RP .
When = 0dR zdz ( )RP that is = + + +z[ ] zc a bc a bc c c z z'' ( 1) [ ]2 [ ] [ ]22 2 2 , we have ==d R zdz ( ) 0RP dRRP zdz
2
2 ( )
+ + ++ + + + +a c b b f z zb za c b b z b( ( 1) ( 2 ) ( 1) [ ]) [ ]2 2 3( 1) [ ]( ( 1) ( 2 ) ( 1) [ ])(2 2 )2 2 2 (3)2 2 2 2 2 2 32 2 2 2 2 2 .and after simplification, we
have
= + +=d R zdz b zz zz zz( ) (1 )2 2 [ ][ ] 3 [ ][ ] [ ][ ] .RP dR zdz
2
2 ( ) 0
2 2 2
3
''
'' 2
2
(3)
RP
We recall that = + r z2 [ ]z
z
z
z
dr z
dz
3 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
( ) 2
2
2
(3) . Then,
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= + + +=d R zdz b zz dr zdz r z( ) (1 )2 2 [ ][ ] ( ) 2 [ ] .RP dR zdz
2
2 ( ) 0
2 2 2
3
''
2
RP
Since = >z F z[ ] 1 ( ) 0, = <z f z[ ] ( ) 0'' and + + >b2 2 02 2 2 to ensure the the Hessian matrix of mRP is a negative
definite. Therefore, <= 0d R zdz ( ) 0RP dRRP zdz
2
2 ( )
if + >r z2 [ ] 0dr zdz( ) 2 , then it follows that R z( )RP is either monotone or unimodal, which implies that R z( )RP has at most two
roots. Also, > = <R z z B climit[ ( ), ] 0RP . Therefore, if R z( )RP has only one root, it corresponds to the maximum of E [ ]mRP ; if it has two roots, the
larger of the two represents the maximum and the smaller represents the minimum of E [ ]mRP . If R z( )RP has only one root, we require that= = >+ ++ + +R A( ) 0RP a A bcb a bc Aa bc( )( 1 )2 2 2( )( ) mRP2 2 2 2 or equivalently + >a bc A 0 and > 0mRP , then only one root of R z( )RP corresponds to the
maximum of E [ ]mRP .
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